The Office for Competition (‘Office’) approved the acquisition of parts of Scotts Ltd (‘Scotts’) by Lidl Immobiliare Malta Ltd (‘Lidl’) following Phase II proceedings and the abandonment of the concentration as originally notified.

The transaction initially involved Lidl acquiring the Attard, Burmarrad, Sliema, and Zabbar properties that were held by Scotts with vacant possession. Following a Phase I appraisal of the notified concentration, the Office deemed that the transaction could prima facie restrict competition. Phase II proceedings thus commenced in February 2021.

During Phase II proceedings, the Office had to delineate the relevant product and geographic markets. In defining the product market, the Office considered the price, quality, range, and services that were offered by stores in Malta and made a distinction between convenience stores and supermarkets. It considered supermarkets and discounters to be bigger in size and to carry a wider product range than convenience and local village stores. Supermarkets and discounters were, thus, taken to form part of a different market than convenience stores. Furthermore, there was a horizontal overlap of activities in the market for supermarkets and discounters, which led the Office to focus on this product market and on market shares of the undertakings party to the concentration.

In defining the geographic market, the Office excluded grocery stores located in Gozo and, as a result, the market was restricted to supermarkets located in Malta – shopping in Gozo would have entailed crossing the harbour between the two islands and would significantly increase a consumer’s travel time.

After various discussions between the undertakings party to the proposed concentration and the Office, the parties took the decision to remove the Zabbar property from the transaction. The Office did not require the parties to submit a new concentration notification form. The removal of the Zabbar property was considered to alleviate any competition concerns that the Office had about the proposed concentration.

Following the Phase II proceedings, the Office found that the concentration did not raise serious doubts as to its lawfulness and the concentration was subsequently approved without conditions.

SAMR conditionally approved Danfoss A/S’s acquisition of hydraulic business of Eaton Corporation subject to conditions on June 7, 2021.

Danfoss was mainly engaged in R&D, manufacturing and sales of products related to refrigeration, heating and hydraulics and engineering solutions. The target business of Eaton was a hydraulic business which was comprised by several companies and assets, mainly engaged in manufacturing and sales of hydraulic components and systems for industrial equipment and mobile equipment.

SAMR identified that the relevant product markets of “hydraulic steering components”, “hydrovalve”, “hydraulic motor” and “hydraulic pump” would be affected by the merger. Geographically, the relevant markets for all the relevant products were defined as Chinese market.

In the Decision, SAMR concluded that the transaction without commitments would have the effect of eliminating and restricting competition in the market of “orbital motors”.

The binding commitments undertaken by Danfoss and the merged entity included that Danfoss Power System (Jiangsu) Limited shall divest its orbital motors business, including all tangible assets, intangible assets (including IP), agreements, lease, commitments, customer orders and employees.  

The Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) cleared the acquisition of Primagaz Nederland B.V. (Primagaz) by DCC Energy Netherlands B.V. (Benegas).

The parties' activities overlapped in the markets for i) propane gas in bulk, and ii) propane gas in cylinders. According to the ACM, the geographical scope of both aforementioned markets was national. Benegas was a provider of gas cylinders made of composite plastic, whereas Primagaz provided lightweight steel gas cylinders. Both parties provided steel gas cylinders.

During the second phase proceedings, the ACM analysed whether gas cylinders (with filling weight up to and including 10.5 kg) made of composite plastic, lightweight steel and steel competed with each other. The results showed that composite plastic gas cylinders and lightweight steel cylinders practically did not compete with each other. The ACM therefore concluded that the acquisition of Primagaz by Benegas had no effect as concerns the offer of composite plastic and lightweight steel gas cylinders.

Moreover, the ACM concluded that composite plastic gas cylinders and lightweight steel gas cylinders experienced more competition pressure from steel gas cylinders than they were facing from each other. Within the market for steel gas cylinders, there were plenty of other providers in the Netherlands. Therefore, the ACM cleared the concentration.

The Department of Justice announced that Huntington Bancshares Incorporated and TCF Financial Corporation have agreed to sell 13 branches in Michigan to resolve antitrust concerns arising form Huntington's planned acquisition of TCF Bank.

Huntington Bancshares Incorporated and TCF Financial Corporation were involved in the banking industry, and had branches across the Midwest United States. 

The DOJ alleged that, if the merger were to go through without divestments, customers' access to competitively priced banking products and services might be harmed. 

Under the terms of the proposed settlement, the parties agreed to:

• divest branches in Michigan, located in Arenac, Charlevoix, Crawford, Newaygo, Otsego, Mecosta, Shiawassee, Wexford, and Missaukee counties, and the city of Midland;
• suspend existing, and not enter in new, non-compete agreements with branch managers and loan officers located in the divestiture counties for 180 days after the merger;
• sell or lease any traditional branches in any overlap markets in Michigan and Ohio to an insured depository institution offering services to small businesses within 3 years of the merger's closing.

The Federal Reserve Board noted that the department will not challenge the merger provided the parties go through with the divestiture and close or sell the branches in the overlapping markets.

The FTC sought to block Lehigh Cement Company LLC's ("Lehigh Cement") $151 million acquisition of rival Pennsylvania-based cement producer Keystone Cement Company ("Keystone"), alleging that the deal would harm regional competition in the market for the key ingredient used to make concrete. 

Lehigh Cement, Heidelberg Cement, and Keystone were all active in the production and sale of gray Portland cement, an essential ingredient for making concrete. 

The FTC alleged that the acquisition would harm competition in the market for gray Portland cement in eastern Pennsylvania and western New Jersey, reducing the number of significant competitors from four to three. As a result of the acquisition, Lehigh would control more than 50% of cement sales in the geographic area, with two other competitors accounting for most of the other sales. Additionally, the FTC alleged that the acquisition would significantly reduce competition for cement customers, as the combined firm would be able to unilaterally raise prices and reduce output and quality. 

The administrative trial is scheduled to begin on November 2, 2021.

On 14 May 2021 the Chamber of the Hellenic Competition Commission approved pursuant to Art. 8(3) of Greek Law 3959/2011, the proposed transaction notified on 31/3/2021, concerning the acquisition of sole control by “TEFORTO HOLDINGS LIMITED” (a subsidiary MOTOR OIL GROUP) over the companies “AIOLIKO PARKO AETOS ENERGY SA,” “AIOLIKI HELLAS INDUSTRIAL & ENERGY SA”, “AIOLIKO PARKO KATO LAKOMATA ANONYMI ENERGEIAKI ETAIRIA”, “VIOTIA AIOLOS PRODUCTION AND EXPLOITATION OF ENERGY SA”, “ANEMOS MAKEDONIAS ANONYMI ENERGEIAKI ETAIRIA” and “AIOLOS ANAPTIKSIAKI KAI SIA FTHIOTIDA SA”.

The parties were active in the the markets (a) for the production and wholesale supply of electricity and (b) supply of electricity at a retail level.

The Hellenic Competition Commission found that the proposed concentration while falling within the scope of Art. 6(1) of Greek Law 3959/2011, did not raise any serious doubts as to its compatibility with the competition rules in the relevant markets involved.

Danfoss's acquisition of Eaton's hydraulics business was approved by CADE's Administrative Tribunal, upon the execution of a merger control agreement that set forth structural and behavioral remedies, in a full-form procedure.

Danfoss was active in the manufacture of components and engineering technology for refrigeration, heating, hydraulics and motor control for mobile machines off-road. The Hydraulics business of Eaton was active mainly in the manufacture and sale of components and hydraulics systems for industrial and mobile equipment.

CADE’s General Superintendence found that the transaction resulted in horizontal overlaps in the markets of hydraulic steering units; priority valves; hydraulic cartridge valves/HICs; hydraulic spool valves; hydraulic gear motors; hydraulic orbital motors; hydraulic piston motors; hydraulic gear pumps; hydraulic piston pumps; and automation and hydraulic control components. In its opinion, the General Superintendence referred the case to CADE’s Tribunal stating that the transaction could lead to the exercise of market power.

CADE's Administrative Tribunal reviewed the transaction and Commissioner Lenisa Rodrigues Prado negotiated a merger control agreement with the parties, which concerned divestment of three plants of Danfoss, which were active in the manufacture of hydraulic steering, orbital motors and hydraulic steering valves; and transfer of two production lines from Eaton to a plant of Danfoss to be divested.

Additionally, the parties agreed to some behavioral remedies, including to waive the exclusivity agreements in force and refrain from entering into new agreements with exclusivity clauses in Brazil for three years; not to acquire manufacturers of units of hydraulic steering, orbital motors, piston pumps involved in manufacturing in Brazil or selling the products to Brazil for three years; and take reasonable measures to encourage distributors of Danfoss/Eaton Hydraulics of hydraulic steering units and orbital motors responsible for sales to Brazil to accept to be hired by the acquirer of the assets divested, if applicable.

As a result, CADE’s Administrative Tribunal approved the transaction, upon execution of a merger control agreement. The decision was taken by an unanimous vote.

The European Commission (“Commission”) issued a fine of EUR 7.5 million against chemical maker Sigma-Aldrich for providing misleading information during merger control proceedings regarding Sigma-Aldrich’s takeover by rival Merck.

Merck notified the Commission of its acquisition of Sigma-Aldrich in April 2015 (Commission case number M.7435). In its investigation, the Commission found that the parties' activities were largely complementary regarding bioscience products and raw materials for pharmaceutical production, meaning that the transaction did not create competitive problems in these markets. However, the Commission had concerns about certain chemicals used in laboratories by companies and research centres for which Merck and Sigma-Aldrich were the two leading suppliers in Europe. In order to address the Commission's concerns, the merging parties offered a comprehensive remedy package, covering all the main steps in the manufacture, supply and distribution of the solvents and inorganics the Commission expressed concerns about. In particular, the package included Sigma's manufacturing assets in Seelze, Germany and brands and trademarks, and was – following an extensive market test and certain improvements by the parties – accepted as a suitable solution by the Commission during the initial 25 day investigation (i.e. phase I), which meant that it was possible to clear the transaction in June 2015.

However, one year later following the implementation of the remedy, a third party reported to the Commission that a Sigma-Aldrich innovation project called “iCap” with relevance for the laboratory chemicals at the core of the Commission’s concerns was not part of the remedies and had not been provided to the purchaser of the remedy package. Until that time, the Commission was not aware of the existence of iCap and explained that if the project had been correctly disclosed, the Commission would have demanded that the iCap innovation be included in the remedy package since it was closely linked to the divestment business and had the potential to substantially increase its sales. According to the Commission, not including iCap impaired the viability and competitiveness of the divested business. Merck subsequently provided a license for iCap to Honeywell, the purchaser of the remedy package.

Suspecting that Merck and Sigma-Aldrich failed to provide the Commission with correct information about iCap, the Commission opened proceedings under Article 14.1 of the EU Merger Control Regulation (Commission case number M.8181) and on 6 July 2017 sent a statement of objections detailing its preliminary view that Sigma intentionally and Merck negligently provided incorrect and misleading information to the Commission. Having heard the parties and following further investigations, in June 2020, the Commission issued a Supplementary Statement of Objections dropping the case against Merck, which as the purchaser prior to the closing of the transaction, had no access to Sigma-Aldrich’s R&D projects. It upheld the allegations against Sigma-Aldrich.

On 3 May 2021, the Commission fined Sigma-Aldrich EUR 7.5 million for three distinct infringements by providing intentionally or at least negligently incorrect or misleading information on the iCap project. According to the Commission, Sigma-Aldrich provided, deliberately or at least negligently, incorrect or misleading information in the explanatory submission describing the remedy package and in the replies to two specific requests for information. The Commission stated that there were indications Sigma-Aldrich intended to hide the project from the Commission to avoid its transfer to the purchaser of the remedies.

Videolar’s 2014 acquisition of Innova, which had been previously approved upon execution of a merger control agreement, was prohibited by CADE’s Administrative Tribunal.

The parties were both active in the petrochemical industry. Innova was controlled by Petrobrás before the transaction.

CADE’s General Superintendence found that the transaction resulted in a horizontal overlap in the polystyrene market and in a vertical integration between the styrene monomer and the polystyrene and its derivatives. The polystyrene market was defined as national while the styrene monomer market was defined as international. CADE’s General Superintendence found that the transaction, if approved without remedies, would generate a duopoly in the polystyrene market.

After the execution of the merger control agreement with CADE in 2014, Videolar acquired Petrobrás’ control of Innova and started to act in the market. The merger control agreement established the following obligations for the companies: (i) maintenance of the volume of polystyrene produced in specific plants for a period of 10 years; (ii) license the companies’ polystyrene and styrene monomer patents freely and unexclusively for a period of 5 years; (iii) establishment of a compliance program; (iv) prohibition of acquiring or renting plants that registered polystyrene production in Brazil for a period of 5 years; among other additional remedies.

In 2019, CADE’s General Superintendence found that the company had failed to comply with the first of the aforementioned obligations, therefore fining the company in 9,000,000.00 BRL and determined that CADE’s Administrative Tribunal should review the merger.

CADE’s Administrative Tribunal recognized that the company failed to comply with the merger control agreement’s first obligation and that it failed to prove that the transaction’s efficiencies were being shared with the consumers. Therefore, the Tribunal determined that (i) the transaction should be unwound and that Videolar should transfer Innova’s tangible and intangible assets back to Petrobrás so it could operate in the market with the same competitive effort as before the transaction; or (ii) Videolar should sell either their plant in Manaus or in Triunfo, or at least one of those plants’ polystyrene business along with all of its tangible and intangible assets.

As a result, CADE’s Administrative Tribunal unanimously prohibited the transaction, determining that Videolar had to choose one of the divestment options above.

The Department of Justice announced that Casey's General Stores, Inc. ("Casey's"), Bucky's Intermediate Holdings, LLC ("Bucky's"), and Steven Buchanan have agreed to divest retail fuel assets in local gasoline and diesel fuel markets across two states to settle FTC charges that Casey's proposed acquisition would violate federal antitrust law.

Casey's and Bucky's were both involved in the retail sale of gasoline and the retail sale of diesel fuel in Nebraska and Iowa. 

In their complaint, the FTC alleged that the acquisition as proposed would harm competition for retail sale of gasoline in seven local markets in Nebraska and Iowa. The FTC also alleged that, in four of these local markets, competition for the retail sale of diesel fuel would also be harmed. The FTC claimed that, without remedy, the acquisition would reduce the number of competitors to three or fewer in these seven local markets. 

Under the terms of the proposed consent order Casey's was required to divest six retail fuel outlets (three Casey's outlets and three Buck's outlets) to Western Oil II, LLC and Danco II, LLC within 10 days of the completion of the acquisition. 

Furthermore, Casey's and Bucky's were required to provide the FTC with notice before acquiring fuel assets within a fixed distance of any Casey's outlet in a market involving the divestiture for 10 years.

The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority ("FCCA") conditionally approved the merger between Altia Oyj and Arcus ASA whereby Arcus is merged into Altia and dissolved. The new combined company will be named ANORA GROUP Plc. Both parties were large wine and spirits brand houses in the Nordic countries.

According to the FCCA, the absorption merger would have negative impacts on the competition in the markets for aquavits and berry liqueurs. The merger would have further concentrated an already highly concentrated market, establishing practically a monopoly especially in the market for aquavits.

To address the FCCA's competition concerns, Altia committed to sell its aquavit brand Skåne Akvavit and Arcus commited to terminate its distribution agreement regarding Liviko AS's Metsmaasikas-strawberry liqueur. The FCCA required an upfront buyer for the aquavit and the parties may not execute the merger before the FCCA has accepted divestment of the Skåne Akvavit. This is the first time the FCCA has required an upfront buyer.

On 19 April 2021 the European Commission (“Commission”) has accepted the request by several EU Member States to refer the merger control assessment of the acquisition of cancer test maker Grail by US life sciences company Illumina to the EU. The merger did neither meet the notification thresholds of the EU Merger Regulation, nor was it subject to merger control in any EU Member State. However, France submitted a referral request to the Commission pursuant to Article 22(1) of the EU Merger Regulation. Under this provision EU Member States can request the Commission to examine a merger that does not have an EU dimension but affects trade within the single market and threatens to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member States making the request. Subsequently six EU and EFTA Member States (Belgium, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands and Norway) joined France's referral request.

In its 19 April 2021 decision accepting the referral request the Commission considers that the Illumina / Grail merger meets the criteria for referral under the Article 22. According to the Commission, the combined entity could restrict access to or increase prices of next generation sequencers and reagents to the detriment of Grail’s rivals active in genomic cancer tests following the merger. The Commission further explained that a referral of the merger was appropriate because the target’s competitive significance was not reflected in its turnover, as the deal value of approx. USD 7 billion showed.

The Commission asked Illumina on the same day to file a formal EU merger control notification of the merger. Illumina is not allowed to implement the transaction before notifying and obtaining clearance from the Commission.

Illumina/Grail is the first case in which the Commission applied a controversial new policy regarding Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation. Under this new policy, the Commission has begun accepting referrals of mergers with relevance for the internal market from national competition authorities even if the referring authorities have no power to review the cases under their national merger control rules. In principle, this new policy allows the Commission – subject to a referral request by at least one member state – to review any merger, a situation which has been widely criticised because of the legal uncertainties it creates.

On 29 April 2021 Illumina confirmed that it filed an action before the EU courts asking for an annulment of the Commission’s decision of 19 April 2021 accepting the referral. This action gives the judges in Luxembourg an early opportunity to decide whether the Commission’s new policy is compatible with the EU Merger Regulation.

The Department of Justice announced that it would require Stone Canyon Industry Holdings LLC ("Stone Canyon") and its portfolio company SCIH Salt Holdings Inc. ("SCIH") to divest their entire evaporated salt business in order to proceed with their proposed acquisition of Morton Salt Inc. ("Morton Salt") from K+S Aktiengesellschaft ("K+S AG")

Morton Salt and SCIH were involved in the production and sale of evaporated salt in the United States. Specifically, Morton Salt and SCIH each produced three types of evaporated salt: pharmaceutical-grade salt, round-can table salt, and bulk evaporated salt. 

In their complaint, the DOJ alleged that Morton and SCIH's subsidiary, US Salt LLC ("US Salt"), were two of only three producers that manufacture and distribute round-can table salt in the United States, and that Morton and US Salt were the only firms producing pharmaceutical-grade salt in the United States and Canada.

The complaint further alleged that Morton and US Salt were only two of three major suppliers that manufactured and distributed bulk evaporated salt in the northeastern United States. The complaint warned that the merger would eliminate competition between Morton and US Salt for the named evaporated salt products, likely leading to higher prices, reduced supply availability, lower quality products, and longer delivery times.

Under the terms of the proposed settlement, Stone Canyon and SCIH agreed to divest:

1. their US Salt subsidiary;
2. their refinery in Watkins Glen, New York; and 
3. other assets used in the production of its evaporated salt products 

The agreement between BRF and UPFIELD for the licensing to BRF of the exclusive use of the Becel brand in Brazil for the production and distribution of margarines was dismissed, as CADE's Administrative Tribunal understood that the transaction was not subject to mandatory filing.

The parties were both active in the national market of production and sale of margarine products.

CADE’s General Superintendence decided not to analyze the merits of the transaction because it considered that the agreement could not be considered a notifiable associative agreement under the terms of the applicable regulation.

Seara Alimentos Ltda., admitted as a third interested party, submitted an appeal to the Administrative Tribunal claiming that the transaction would result in anticompetitive effects in the national market of sale of margarine products.

CADE's Administrative Tribunal dismissed Seara’s appeal, as the agreement was for a period of 12 months and, hence, did not meet the time criterion to be considered as an associative agreement (a common endeavor between competitors with two years term and sharing of risks and results). Besides, the transaction would result in a minor modification in the level of concentration in the relevant market.

As a result, the Administrative Tribunal maintained General Superintendence's decision. The decision was taken by a majority vote (six to one), with the dissenting vote for the mandatory filing of the transaction.

Tupy's acquisition of Teksid's iron foundry business was approved by CADE's Administrative Tribunal, upon execution of a merger control agreement that concerned structural and behavioral remedies, in a full-form procedure.

The Parties were both active in markets for cast-iron components. Tupy served both the capital goods industry and the passenger vehicle segment, while Teksid served the automobile and industrial vehicle sectors, among others.

CADE’s General Superintendence found that the transaction resulted in horizontal overlaps in the markets of manufacture and supply of: (i) iron engine blocks for domestic passenger and light commercial vehicles; (ii) iron engine blocks for domestic medium, heavy and off-road applications; (iii) iron cylinders heads for domestic medium, heavy and off-road applications; and (iv) other domestic cast-iron components. In its opinion, the General Superintendence referred the case to CADE’s Tribunal recommending the disapproval of the transaction.

CADE's Administrative Tribunal reviewed the transaction and Counselor Luis Henrique Bertolino Braido's staff negotiated a merger control agreement with the parties, which concerned a substantial divestment of contracts signed for the supply of iron engine blocks and iron cylinders heads to competitors. Additionally, the parties agreed to some behavioral remedies in order to facilitate, for a period of five years, possible changes in demand by the customers of Tupy and Teksid, without any modifications in the contractual conditions.

As a result, CADE’s Administrative Tribunal approved the transaction, upon execution of a merger control agreement. The decision was taken by an unanimous vote.

Magalu's acquisition of Hub's payment institution regulated by the Central Bank of Brazil (BACEN) was approved without conditions by CADE's Administrative Tribunal in a full-form procedure.

The Parties are both active in payments arrangements markets. Magalu Payments is controlled by Magazine Luiza, which operates in the retail trade of durable goods through both a digital e-commerce platform, including an application, website and virtual stores, as well as conventional physical stores, while Hub acts as a Banking as a Service (BaaS) platform and provides prepaid card processing services, serving customers in various segments such as retail, mobility, financial institutions and fintechs.

CADE’s General Superintendence found that the transaction resulted in a vertical integration between the online retail activity provided by Magazine Luiza and the activities of issuing electronic money and management of payment accounts provided by Hub Companies. CADE’s General Superintendence did not identify competition concerns generated by the deal and approved the transaction.

Mercado Pago, a competitor qualified as a third party in the case, filed an appeal against CADE’s General Superintendence decision. Mercado Pago claimed that, as Hub provided payment solution services, it holds individual data from its customers, including payment transactions. Therefore, according to Mercado Pago, Magalu’s potential access to Hub stored data could result in harmful anticompetitive effects for the market.

CADE’s Administrative Tribunal then recognized that Hub only stores such data due to the regulatory impositions of the Brazilian Central Bank, that the data is not sensitive, and the parties did not have enough market power to generate anticompetitive effects after the transaction. CADE’s Tribunal also understood that the transaction does not create or reinforce any dominant position nor increases barriers to entry or implies a reduction in competition.

As a result, CADE’s Administrative Tribunal unanimously approved the transaction.

The Office for Competition approved the acquisition of sole control of M.T. Mediterranean Towers Limited, a company owned by Epic Communications Limited, by Phoenix Tower International Limited.

M.T. Mediterranean Towers Limited owned some of the assets within Epic Communications Limited’s portfolio, including towers and rooftops holding passive infrastructure required for the provision of hospitality services for operators in the telecommunications industry. As a result of the concentration, Phoenix Tower International Group offered hosting services through M.T. Mediterranean Towers Limited and leased the sites to operators of mobile telecommunications in Malta. 

The Office for Competition found that the concentration did not raise serious doubts as to its lawfulness and approved it without conditions. 

The FTC filed an adminsitrative complaint in an attempt to block Illumina, Inc.'s proprosed $1.7 billion acquisition  of GRAIL, Inc.

Illumina  and GRAIL were both involved in the research, development, and commercialization of MCED tests. MCED tests are designed to detect multiple types of early-stage cancer in asymptomatic individuals by searching for any DNA or RNA fragments shed by cancerous cells.

The FTC alleged that the proposed acquisition would substantially lessen competition in the U.S. MCED test market, resulting in reduced innovation and potentiallly increased prices and reduced choice and quality of MCED tests. The FTC also stated that the proposed acquisition would negatively impact the ability for Americans to receive early-stage diagnoses and sucessful treatment of their cancers. 

The administrative trial challenging the proposed acquisition is scheduled to begin on August 24, 2021.

The Hellenic Competition Commission unconditionally approved pursuant to Art. 8(3) of Greek Law 3959/2011, the proposed acquisition by the company "Assicurazioni Generali - Societa per Azioni" of the 99,9% of the shares of the company "Axa Insurance S.A." (Greek branch).

Within Greece, the parties were active in the wider market for life insurance, non-life insurance and reinsurance services and the sub-markets for risk insurance of transported goods, of fire and nature elements and other property damage.

The Hellenic Competition Commission found that the proposed concentration did not raise any serious doubts as to its compatibility with the competition rules in the relevant markets involved.

The Department of Justice announced that it would require Republic Services Inc. ("Republic") to divest waste collection and disposal assets in five states in order to proceed with its acquisition of Santek Waste Services LLC ("Santek").

Republic and Santek were involved in the small container commercial waste collection and municipal solid waste disposal markets across the United States.

The DOJ and the Alabama Attorney General alleged in their complaint that, in each of the local markets (located in Texas, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas) Republic and Santek competed against each other and were two of only a few significant providers of small container commercial waste collection and solid waste disposal. They alleged that the combination of the two companies would eliminate head to head competition and threaten the lower prices and better service that customers have realized from that competition. Additionally, the DOJ and the Attorney Generals office also alleged that the proposed acquisition would limit the ability of collection rivals to compete with the merged company's collection operations in Chattanooga, Tennessee and the North Georgia area. 

Under the terms of the proposed settlement, Republic and Santek agreed to:

1. divest waste collection routes and associated assets in Texas to Waste Connections Inc., or an alternative acquirer approved by the United States; and
2. divest landfills, transfer stations, hauling locations, and waste collection routes in Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, and Mississippi to Kinderhooks Industries LLC, or an alternative acquirer approved by the United States. 

The GSHMED acquisition of the shares held by Unimed Leste Fluminense in the capital stock of a specific purpose company was unconditionally approved by CADE’s Administrative Tribunal in a fast-track procedure.

GSHMED was active in the provision of medical services in the field of hemotherapy, while Unimed Leste Fluminense was a medical cooperative that offered health care plans and also owned health care units.

CADE's General Superintendence analyzed horizontal overlaps in the market for hemotherapeutic services; as well as vertical relations in the markets for (a) hemotherapeutic services and hospital services; and (b) home care services and health insurance, and concluded that the transaction would not generate anticompetitive effects. Thus, CADE's General Superintendence unconditionally approved the transaction.

Clínica de Hemoterapia Ltda., admitted as a third interested party, submitted an appeal to the Administrative Tribunal claiming that the transaction would be harmful to competition.

CADE's Administrative Tribunal dismissed Clínica de Hemoterapia’s appeal, as the market shares of the parties, together with other elements related to the competitive dynamics of the affected relevant markets (such as the existence of rivals with high market shares, renown and/or acting with a large territorial coverage), mitigated any competition concerns resulting from the transaction.

As a result, the Administrative Tribunal maintained General Superintendence's decision, unconditionally approving the transaction. The decision was taken by a unanimous vote.

The FTC approved a final order settling charges that E. & J. Gallo Winery's $1.7 billion acquisition of assets from Constellation Brands, Inc. would violate federal antitrust law. 

E. & J. Gallo and Constellation Brands were both active in the alcholic beverages market, specifically in the sale of low priced sparkling wine to on-premise and off premise retailers. Additionally, both parties were also invovled in the sale of low-priced brandy, low-priced port and sherry, and high color concentrates. 

The FTC alleged that the acquisition would eliminate direct and substantial competition between the parties, increase the likelihood that E. & J. Gallo would unilaterally exercise market power, and would likely increase the prices for low-priced sparkling wines, brandy, port, sherry and high color concentrates in the relevant geographic market.

Under the terms of the final order, E & J. Gallo and Constellation Brands agreed to:

1. divest several product lines; and 
2. remove certain other products from its asset purchase agreement.

The Hellenic Competition Commission unconditionally approved the acquisition of joint control by Alpha Satellite Television SA (which operated the Greek TV station “ALPLHA”) and New Television SA (which operated the Greek TV station “STAR”) over the company Green Pixel Productions SA, which was active mainly in the production of television programs, movies and videos.

Within Greece the parties were active in the markets of the production and supply of TV content and retail provision of TV services to end customers.

The Hellenic Competition Commission found that the proposed transaction did not raise any competition concerns in the relevant markets affected.

The transaction consisted in the merger between CaixaBank, S.A. (Caixabank) and Bankia, S.A. (Bankia). The transaction was authorized by the National Commission for Markets and Competition (CNMC) in phase-I with commitments.

The CNMC considered that, as the merger would combine the third and fourth positioned financial firms in the Spanish territory, without commitments it would significantly hamper competition in several subsegments of retail banking (i.e., in that of retail banking deposits, retail banking credits and bank branches), as well as the market for ATMs. In particular, the CNMC identified the following risks with regards to the market of retail banking: (i) financial foreclosure in locations where only the parties were present, due to the possible closure of bank branches; and (ii) worsening of commercial conditions in those locations where the transaction would lead to a monopoly or little competitive pressure. Moreover, regarding the ATM market, the CNMC found a potential risk for customers of other banks that had agreements with Bankia to lose their access to its ATMs network and therefore to pay a higher commission.

To put at ease such worries of the CNMC, CaixaBank committed to:

1. identify the customers of Bankia that were eligible for the “social account” of CaixaBank, and inform them about the possibility of benefiting from it;
2. inform the customers of Bankia about the approval of the merger and about the possible changes in the products that could affect them (with the prior approval of the communication by the CNMC);
3. not to disappear from any municipality in which any of the parties were present and there were no competing office (except in exceptional cases subject to prior authorization by the CNMC);
4. for a period of three years, in the local markets (postal codes) in which the resulting entity would hold a monopoly position, to keep Bankia customers under unchanged conditions and terms, and in the local markets with weakened competition, to offer its products under conditions that were substantially the same or not worse to those it offered in the three postal codes in which it had more exposure to competitors, as well as not to charge commissions to customers from Bankia for an at-the-counter transaction that would have been free under the conditions offered by Bankia in any of the problematic areas;
5. for a period of 18 months, to offer to customers of the entities with which Bankia had agreements of access to its ATMs, access to ATMs that were owned by Bankia before the merger under the same conditions, as well as to give those customers access to the closest CaixaBank ATM in case of a closure of Bankia ATMs as a result of the merger; and 
6. in relation to Caixabank's and Bankia's minority shareholdings in other (payment management) companies held prior to the merger, Caixabank committed to divest the excess stake in the share capital of these companies arising from the merger with respect to the limit set out in its own bylaws and shareholders' agreements (and, pending such divestment, not to exercise any voting rights arising from these excesses).

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority approved Intact Financial Corporation's acquisition of  RSA Insurance Group plc's activies danish activities in Codan A/S on the basis of a simplified notification. The transaction resulted in Intact acquiring sole control over RSA's danish activities in Codan A/S. Notably, however, Intact and Tryg A/S would each own 50% of the Danish activities in Codan A/S, but Tryg would only have 49.8 % of the votes. Furthermore, Intact and Tryg A/S had entered into an agreement where Tryg acquired sole control over RSA's activities in Norway and Sweden.

Intact was a Canadian insurance company with no activities in Denmark, whereas Tryg and Codan in terms of market shares were number 1 and 3 respectively on the insurance market broadly in Denmark. 

As the merger caused Tryg to have a significant ownership interest in the danish activities in Codan A/S, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority obtained information from the parties in order to determine Tryg's influence on Codan's danish activities and the significance of Tryg's ownership. 

However, the merger did not give rise to objections, and it was approved after a simplified case proceeding. The level of detail about the assessment is very limited.